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SYMPOSIUM:
BIOETHICS, LAW, AND
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
WHAT SYNTHETIC GENOMES MEAN FOR
OUR FUTURE: TECHNOLOGY, ETHICS, AND
LAW, INTERESTS AND IDENTITIES
Thomas H. Murray, Ph.D.*
Is synthetic biology best understood as a continuation of the more
than three decades of scientific activity aimed at “hacking” biology,
beginning with the first successful attempts to recombine DNA? Or is it
a distinctive and novel endeavor with profound implications for public
policy—for how we think about and manage risks? Is it so distinctive
that it threatens to arouse conflicts over the identities through which we
understand and shape our lives?
Part I of this article will show how synthetic biology is being
defined, provide examples of proposed applications, and describe four
major streams of scientific and technological developments, all of which
fall under the umbrella of synthetic biology.1 It will then take up two
*
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1
See infra Part I (discussing the different conceptions of the definition of synthetic
biology).
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interrelated questions.2 First, is synthetic biology best understood as a
series of incremental developments in the decades-long scientific effort
to “hack” biology, or should it be seen as a sharp departure from the
past? Second, how significant is the shift in emphasis from hypothesisdriven science aimed at explaining biology to an engineering mindset
that regards explanation and understanding as far less important than
control and predictability?
Part II will examine the challenges synthetic biology poses to policy.
What risks have aroused the greatest concern?3 What policy responses
have been proposed and how likely are they to achieve important goals
such as protecting against the use of synthetic biology for biological
warfare or bioterrorism as well as against inadvertent harms (sometimes
called “bioerror”)?
Part III delineates and critically examines three broad principles or
stances that frame both ethical analysis and policy.4 The first, the
precautionary principle, is often invoked by those suspicious of or
opposed to some technology.5 The second, the proactionary principle,
opts to give the benefit of the doubt to such innovations.6 In practice,
neither the precautionary nor the proactionary principle routinely
dominates in national policies, and there are many variants of both. The
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues (“PCSBI”), in
its report on synthetic biology, proposed a third principle, a via media,
which they have labeled “prudent vigilance,” a concept that warrants
explication and critical analysis.7
The content of disputes involving technology, ethics, and policy
include more than enthusiasm for technological innovation, and fears of
See infra Part I.B (explaining major changes that have occurred in the development of
synthetic biology such as the application of an engineering mindset and the differences in
expectations, training, and culture that accompany it).
3
See infra Part II.A (proposing that the biosecurity risks posed by synthetic biology are
of great concern to the public).
4
See infra Part III.B (discussing the differing ways the United States and Europe view
the advance of synthetic biology).
5
The precautionary principle holds that “in the face of reasonable fear of severe
harmful effects on people or the environment, governments may be justified in imposing
measures to prevent this harm, even in the absence of conclusive scientific evidence.”
Karsten Klint Jensen, The Moral Foundation of the Precautionary Principle, 15 J. AGRIC. &
ENVTL. ETHICS 39, 39 (2002).
6
“[T]he Proactionary Principle urges all parties to actively take into account all the
consequences of an activity—good as well as bad—while apportioning precautionary
measures to the real threats we face, in the context of an appreciation of the crucial role
played by technological innovation . . .”
Max More, The Proactionary Principle,
MAXMORE.COM (July 29, 2005), http://www.maxmore.com/proactionary.htm.
7
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS:
THE ETHICS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 4 (2010).
2
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innovation’s unanticipated or unwelcomed consequences. Part IV
describes how debates on two controversies—embryonic stem cell
research and genetically modified foods—received very different
treatments in the U.S. and the UK.8 Perhaps viewing public policy
disputes as a conflict of competing interests will be helpful in discerning
the major disputes in synthetic biology.9 Part IV also introduces the
distinction between conflicts that revolve around disputes over interests
and conflicts over identities.10 The article concludes with reflections on
the usefulness of the interests/identities distinction for coming conflicts
over synthetic biology.11
I. WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY?
The Royal Academy of Engineering offered this definition in 2009:
“Synthetic biology aims to design and engineer biologically based parts,
novel devices and systems as well as redesigning existing, natural
biological systems.”12 The European Commission described synthetic
biology as
. . . the engineering of biology: the synthesis of complex,
biologically based (or inspired) systems which display
functions that do not exist in nature. This engineering
perspective may be applied at all levels of the hierarchy
of biological structures . . . . In essence, synthetic biology
will enable the design of ‘biological systems’ in a
rational and systematic way.13
The President’s Commission stuck a similar tone in its December 2010
report: “synthetic biology [ ] aims to apply standardized engineering
techniques to biology and thereby create organisms or biological systems
with novel or specialized functions to address countless needs.”14 This
See infra Part IV.A (delving into the specific aspects of synthetic biology that are in
controversy in the U.S. and UK).
9
See infra Part IV.B (using the Chrysler corporation’s near failure to illustrate the
competing interests that must be considered in public policy disputes).
10
See infra Part IV.C (proposing that issues of identity which arise in the abortion debate
present an alterative dynamic to public policy disputes).
11
See infra Part V (examining the effect that conflicting interests and identity disputes
have on the burgeoning field of synthetic biology).
12
ROYAL ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: SCOPE, APPLICATIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS 13 (2009) (emphasis added).
13
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: APPLYING ENGINEERING TO BIOLOGY 5
(2005).
14
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 7, at 2
(2010) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8
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sampling of definitions is reasonably consistent with a surprisingly wide
range of definitions that have been offered for such a nascent
enterprise.15
These and other typical efforts to define synthetic biology are as
interesting for what they leave out as for what they include. First, they
make no attempt to specify the disciplines or professions that may claim
to be practicing synthetic biology. Biologists of many stripes, of course,
may be practicing synthetic biology, but so may engineers,
mathematicians, computer scientists, physicists and biochemists.
Indeed, some of the ambitions of synthetic biologists stretch or burst the
boundaries of biochemistry. The eminent scientist and business leader
George Poste has suggested that synthetic biology is by definition not
what we have traditionally regarded as biological: “The boundary
between synthetic biology and systems biology should reside in a single
criterion: has the engineered process, product or organism been
fabricated from natural materials (systems biology) or from components
not adopted in natural evolution (synthetic biology)?”16
Second, the various definitions of synthetic biology do not try to
claim any particular set of tools and methods. Those employed can vary
hugely and still be considered the practice of synthetic biology. This
includes old and new tools in genetic engineering (sequencing, DNA
synthesis, assorted methods for manipulating genomes and DNA
sequences) and what Ron Weiss, an engineer at MIT, lists as the
“engineering principles and methodologies that have worked well in
other established fields (e.g., modularity, system fabrication using
libraries of well-characterized and interchangeable parts, rapid
prototyping, predictive models and robust designs).”17
Third, the definitions do not declare any fixed set of goals beyond
developing the tools and knowledge to bend or alter natural systems to
serve human intentions. Adam Arkin, a bioengineer at University of
California-Berkeley, asserts “[s]ynthetic biology aims to make the
engineering of new function in biology faster, cost effective, scalable,
predictable, transparent and safe.”18

See generally What’s in a Name?, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1071 (2009) (providing the
range of definitions of synthetic biology and the key disputes about its boundaries with
genetic engineering, systems biology, and metabolic engineering). Twenty commentators
including leading researchers in synthetic biology and scholars on its legal and ethical
implications offer their often competing definitions of the field. Id.
16
Id. at 1073. Other leaders in the field disagree and propose more inclusive definitions
of synthetic biology. Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. at 1071.
15
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Some practitioners of synthetic biology attach little importance to
definitional exercises. Andrew D. Ellington at University of TexasAustin writes:
These words [synthetic biology] don’t have much
meaning. The definition of a new field is either based on
a discovery or redefinition, and—because I can’t point to
a single great discovery in this field—synthetic biology
is really more about a redefinition of biotechnology. It
encompasses the rather old notion that you can engineer
living systems, but updates that notion with the
universal realization that the ability to synthesize lots of
DNA and do mathematical modeling is a very powerful
combination. But I’d say synthetic biology’s key utility
is to excite engineers, undergraduates and funding
agencies. Its key disadvantage is to create hysteria in the
defense community.19
The theme that runs through the disparate efforts to define synthetic
biology is the application of an engineering mindset to biological or
quasi-biological systems. Proposed applications cover a great range.
Bacteria and yeast have had their metabolism altered so that they
produce artemisinic acid, a precursor of the potent anti-malarial drug
artemisinin. The microbe pseudomonas can now degrade certain
pesticides, thanks to intentional changes wrought by human hands.
High-value industrial chemicals can be produced by yeast.20
A. Major Streams of Scientific and Technological Developments
Not surprisingly, in such a dynamic and youthful enterprise,
commentators are not unanimous in how they carve up the field. The
four major streams described here are not meant as magisterial
pronouncements, only as helpful descriptions that will surely become
outdated as the field expands.
The first stream is advanced genetic engineering. It employs the
relatively familiar but increasingly powerful tools that scientists have
been perfecting since the recombinant DNA era began in the mid-1970s,
and it is supplemented by the knowledge and tools developed through
Id. (alteration in original).
See Press Release, Amyris, Amyris’s First Commercial Production Facility Complete
and Operational (Apr. 29, 2011), available at http://www.amyrisbiotech.com/en/
newsroom/202-amyriss-first-commercial-production-facility-complete-and-operational.
Amyris is producing farnesene in Brazil at an industrial scale. Id.
19
20
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genome sequencing. According to leading researchers such as Jay
Kiesling, whose teams are responsible for both the artimisinic acid and
farnesene producing organisms, success depends upon serendipity as
much as engineering-like design.21 Products from this stream are on a
faster track towards commercial production than the other streams.
The second stream is DNA-based device construction. Taking its
inspiration directly from engineering fields such as electronics, this
movement envisions building catalogues of well-characterized standard
parts that can be assembled into systems or “circuits” that would reliably
accomplish whatever task the designing engineer wished. Like their
counterparts in electronic engineering, designers could pluck whatever
transmitters, actuators, sensors, or other components they needed from
the available parts list. The movement has created its own institutions
such as the BioBricks Foundation and the MIT Registry of Standard
Biological Parts.22 Simplification and standardization are key aims; the
BioBricks movement has also embraced the open source concept,
encouraging innovators to deposit their bioparts into a common registry
that is available to all. Drew Endy, one of BioBricks’ most visible and
charismatic advocates, sums up the movement’s guiding spirit: “if you
consider nature to be a machine, you can see that it is not perfect and
that it can be revised and improved.”23
Creating a Lego-like biology has many appealing features. Imagine
a world of synthetic biology where anyone with a good idea can take
freely from a public registry whatever components are needed to
assemble a device that could solve an important problem, entertain,
decorate, or do any of a host of things humans desire. However, the
BioBricks movement faces serious challenges. It has proven fairly easy
to create bioparts, but standardizing them and getting them to work in
predictable ways has been more difficult. Feedback loops are familiar
problems in electronic systems and software development, but the
complex interactions within even relatively simple biological systems
may be more challenging to cope with. Also, the democratization of
biological innovation spurred by open access to bioparts must confront
the likelihood that not all cherished ideas will be good ideas. Some will
lead to inadvertent dangers; in other cases, the designer may have

21

ROBERT CARLSON, BIOLOGY IS TECHNOLOGY: THE PROMISE, PERIL, AND NEW BUSINESS

OF ENGINEERING LIFE 101 (2011).

BIOBRICKS FOUNDATION, http://biobricks.org/ (last visited June 28, 2011); REGISTRY
STANDARD BIOLOGICAL PARTS, MIT, http://partsregistry.org/Main_Page (last visited
June 28, 2011).
23
RINIE VAN EST, HUIB DE VRIEND & BART WALHOUT, CONSTRUCTING LIFE:
THE WORLD OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 2 (2007).
22

OF
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malign intentions. How to discourage or head off such dangers is a
challenge to be taken very seriously.
The third stream entails the creation of a minimal cell that could be
used, for example, as a “chassis” onto which different parts assemblies
could be mounted. The analogy here is with automobile manufacturers
who can use a basic structure to build many types of vehicles, from
family sedans to SUVs. Scientists at the J. Craig Venter Institute (“JCVI”)
announced the creation of a “synthetic bacterial cell” in May 2010.24 The
scientists obtained the sequence of Mycoplasma mycoides, a bacterium
with a relatively small genome (1.08 million DNA base pairs).25 They
then designed 1,078 “cassettes” each 1,080 base pairs in length and had
them manufactured by a commercial DNA synthesis company, Blue
Heron Biotechnology.26 Yeast cells were used to stitch the cassettes
together into ever-longer sequences in three stages until the full-length
genome, with such added texts as quotes, authors’ names, and an email
address, was assembled. The artificial chromosome was then inserted
into the cell of a closely related bacterium, Mycoplasma capricolum,
whose enzyme that protects the cell against the invasion of foreign DNA
had been disabled. The synthetically designed genome took over the
intracellular mechanisms of Mycoplasma capricolum yielding cells
containing only the inserted DNA within two days.
The larger significance of this research is in dispute. The JCVI
describes it as a “proof of principle that genomes can be designed in the
computer, chemically made in the laboratory and transplanted into a
recipient cell to produce a new self-replicating cell controlled only by the
synthetic genome.”27 They predict ever-wider uses of their technology
that “will undoubtedly lead to the development of many important
applications and products including biofuels, vaccines, pharmaceuticals,
clean water and food products,”28 while others are more skeptical.
The fourth stream does not attempt to redirect existing biological
entities but rather to create entirely new ones. For example, the effort to
construct protocells proposes to redesign, synthesize and assemble basic
cellular components using combinations not found in nature. The
ProtoLife project surrounds RNA ribozymes with a fatty acid membrane.

24
Press Release, J. Craig Venter Institute, First Self-Replicating Synthetic Bacterial Cell
(May 20, 2010), available at http://www.jcvi.org/cms/press/press-releases/fulltext/article/first-self-replicating-synthetic-bacterial-cell-constructed-by-j-craig-venterinstitute-researcher/. [hereinafter J. Craig Venter Institute].
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
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This stream’s vision of a new biology is ambitious. One of its leaders
described its goal as the creation of
a new form of life . . . a genuinely new living entity,
albeit one not based on biology and not made out of the
customary biological ingredients:
no DNA, no
conventional biomolecules, no cell membrane of the
ordinary type, no nucleus, no mitochondria, no
endoplasmic reticulum or any of the other innumerable
vital trappings of normal, orthodox biological cells.29
Whether this movement will achieve its goal is uncertain.
B. Understanding the Evolution of Synthetic Biology
How is synthetic biology’s relationship with more than three
decades of efforts to “hack” biology best understood? Are the various
streams of synthetic biology merely the latest in a long series of
incremental developments? Or do the collection of activities under the
rubric of synthetic biology depart in fundamental ways from the past?
What clues may be found in the shift in emphasis from hypothesisdriven science aimed at explaining biology to an engineering mindset
that regards explanation and understanding as far less important than
control and predictability?
The continuity/discontinuity distinction is not central to
understanding what is new and important in synthetic biology. The
most significant change is not the increasingly sophisticated tools but
instead, the application of an engineering mindset to biological systems,
and the differences in professional expectations, training, and culture
that accompany it. The differences are not all-or-none in nature, and the
generalizations to come are admittedly crude efforts to mark a complex
and uneven terrain. But even subtle differences can have important
consequences. Biologists, as scientists, aim to understand the complexity
of biological entities and processes. Engineers can have a different
attitude towards complexity. Tom Knight, one of the founders of the
BioBricks movement put it this way: “[a]n alternative to understanding
complexity is to get rid of it.”30
Along with the differences in expectations, such as understanding
versus control, come differences in training and culture. Physics may
have been the first of the natural sciences to confront the life-altering,
ED REGIS, WHAT IS LIFE?: INVESTIGATING THE NATURE OF LIFE IN THE AGE OF
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 3 (2009).
30
Philip Ball, Starting from Scratch, 431 NATURE 624, 625 (2004).
29
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even planet-altering, power of their science with the creation of nuclear
weapons, but biology was compelled to confront its moral
responsibilities in the 1970s when it devised the tools that allowed
biologists to move bits of DNA between organisms. The famous
Asilomar Conference in 1975 was in effect a formal acknowledgement
that biology now possessed powers to do great good—or great harm. 31
Biological scientists since Asilomar have been exposed to ethical debates
over the aims and consequences of their research. Engineers may also
receive formal training in professional ethics, but their deep involvement
in the complexities of biology is of more recent vintage.
To summarize, where molecular biology emphasizes discovery and
explanation, molecular engineering prizes the capacity to design.
Molecular biology attends to emergent properties, while molecular
engineering focuses on control and prediction. Finally, where molecular
biology struggles to understand complexity, molecular engineering
desires to simplify and streamline.
At present, it is unknown how readily biological complexity will
yield to engineers’ aspirations for simplification, predictability and
control. If the complexity of biological systems turns out to be an
enduring impediment for some of the principal streams in synthetic
biology, at least two important implications emerge.
First,
investments—from government and foundation grants to angel and
venture capital firms—may become more difficult to obtain for those
streams. Second, both technical analyses and public perceptions of the
risks from synthetic biology will be more cautious as predictability and
control is less certain.
II. SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY
The ability to reconstruct virulent organisms eventually gets the
attention of policy makers and the public.32 The power to tinker with
such organisms to enhance their virulence or to add pathological
31
See generally Paul Berg et al., Summary Statement of the Asilomar Conference on
Recombinant DNA Molecules, 72 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 1981 (1975) (summarizing the
Asilomar Conference).
32
See e.g., Ray Kurzweil & Bill Joy, Recipe for Destruction, N.Y. TIMES, October 17, 2005, at
A19 (urging discretion in publishing genetic information to prevent dangerous viruses
from reaching the public). The reconstruction of the 1918 influenza virus in a lab in 2005
set off a host of security and public health concerns. Id. If one were able to create new
pathogens, such as the H1N1 virus, and these pathogens accidentally escaped, they could
pose a severe threat to public health. Id. See also General Information, FLU.GOV,
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/general/ (last visited June 28, 2011). The discovery of the
H1N1 virus led to the announcement of a nationwide public health emergency in late
March and early April 2009. Id.
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properties to currently benign ones increases our interest further. Part
II.A will discuss the distinguishable concerns of biosecurity and
biosafety in synthetic biology. Then, Part II.B will propose three
plausible avenues that could advance biosecurity and minimize harm.
A. Concerns of Biosecurity and Biosafety
One useful distinction is between concerns over biosecurity and
biosafety. Biosecurity includes both state-based biowarfare and nonstate sponsored bioterrorism. Biosafety concerns, which some call
“bioerror,” include laboratory accidents, inadvertent releases of modified
organisms into the environment, horizontal gene transfer between
modified and unmodified organisms, and the capacity of living
organisms to evolve and adapt in ways we cannot anticipate.
Biosecurity concerns in synthetic biology have drawn the attention
of policy makers and scientists for many years.33 Political defenses, from
treaties and international covenants to foreign aid and other forms of
influence, are available when dealing with state actors. Non-state actors,
such as would-be bioterrorists, are more elusive targets. Scientists
familiar with synthetic biology have both good and bad news to offer.
The bad news first: the “de-skilling” of synthetic biology makes it easier
for malevolent actors to manufacture pathological organisms. DNA
synthesis firms have been screening for suspect sequences, but the
effectiveness of such procedures is disputed,34 and the spread of DNA
synthesis technology around the world constrains any single nation’s
ability to limit access to synthetic DNA sequences that might be used to
assemble a harmful microbe. Now, the good news: weaponizing
33
See generally Screening Framework Guidance for Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA
Providers, 74 Fed. Reg. 62319 (Nov. 27, 2009) (providing voluntary guidance to “the gene
and genome synthesis industry”); MICHELE S. GARFINKEL, SYNTHETIC GENOMICS: OPTIONS
FOR GOVERNANCE (2007); NATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY,
ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY CONCERNS RELATED TO THE SYNTHESIS OF SELECT AGENTS (2006)
[hereinafter NSABB, ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY CONCERNS]; NATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY
BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY, PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF DUAL USE LIFE
SCIENCES RESEARCH: STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING THE POTENTIAL MISUSE OF RESEARCH
INFORMATION (2007) [hereinafter NSABB, PROPOSED FRAMEWORK]; MICHAEL RODEMEYER,
NEW LIFE, OLD BOTTLES: REGULATING FIRST-GENERATION PRODUCTS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
(2009); PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, supra note 7;
MILDRED K. CHO & DAVID A. RELMAN, Synthetic “Life,” Ethics, National Security, and Public
Discourse, 329 SCI. 38 (2010).
34
Markus Fischer & Stephen M. Maurer, Harmonizing Biosecurity Oversight for Gene
Synthesis, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 20, 20 (2010) (explaining that these are not as
effective because “each DNA synthesis company implements [the procedures]
differently”); David A. LaVan & Louis M. Marmon, Safe and Effective Synthetic Biology, 28
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1010, 1010–12 (2010) (noting that current procedures “could be
improved” because they “rely on voluntary participation”).
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biological pathogens is a significant challenge, one unlikely to be met by
non-state actors. The possibility remains of less sophisticated strategies,
for example, the bioterror equivalent of a suicide bomber who is infected
with some pathogen and then attempts to spread it to individuals in the
target locality.
One additional possible bit of good news: complexity and emergent
properties may be our friends. Both the manufacture and the spread of
effective synthetic biological weapons are beset with uncertainty. The
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity noted in 2006:
Current scientific understanding reveals that it is often
the combination or interaction of genetic elements that
underlie these properties rather than one specific gene
sequence. Furthermore, the harmful consequences of
biological agents are dependent upon the coordination
[of] multiple factors, including host susceptibility, the
agent’s infectivity, transmissibility and virulence, and
the availability of prophylactic or therapeutic
interventions.35
It may prove difficult to prevent bioterrorists from trying to create a
biological weapon. But the potency of any such weapons will be difficult
to predict, and their “success” will be a function of multiple factors
including many—such as the range of public health responses to other
infectious agents, vaccines, and therapies—over which we have control
and can deploy to minimize the harm done.
B. Proposed Policy Responses to Curtail Biosecurity Concerns
Of the regulatory frameworks proposed for synthetic biology, three
will be considered here: self-governance; government regulation; and
international agreements.
The American Society for Microbiology (“ASM”) provided a cogent
example of self-regulation by the scientific community with its 2003
initiative to screen manuscripts to protect against publishing information
that would threaten biosecurity, including the possibility of dual-use.
Over 16,000 manuscripts were reviewed.36 Three received special
scrutiny, one was modified, and not a single manuscript of the more

NSABB, ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY CONCERNS, supra note 33, at 14.
Brian Rappert, The Benefits, Risks, and Threats of Biotechnology, 35 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 2
(2008).
35
36
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than 16,000 reviewed was withheld from publication because of
biosecurity concerns.37
What lesson are we to draw from this experiment in selfgovernance? The tiny number selected for scrutiny is notable. It may be
that scientists know better than to try to publish papers that could
threaten biosecurity, or perhaps they sent such papers to other journals
during that interval. It is possible that the reviewers were reluctant to
deny publication for their fellow scientists and used a very high
threshold before deeming a paper worthy of special attention. The ASM
initiative constitutes a proof of principle: that scientific societies are
capable of organizing a process designed to forestall the publication of
threatening material. Absent additional information shedding light on
the process, however, it is difficult to judge whether the initiative was
successful in its ambition to advance biosecurity.
Government regulation is another plausible avenue. The case of
DNA synthesizers provides an illuminating illustration of the difficulties
any single nation will face in attempting to keep crucial equipment out
of the hands of those intending harm. A recent search on eBay turned up
a used DNA synthesizer for US$2,500.38 Such machines vary from the
size of a microwave to a refrigerator. Top-of-the-line new devices can
cost in excess of $100,000, but as the eBay example shows, used ones can
be found for far less. There are more than 20 manufacturers worldwide
and alternative technologies, such as DNA synthesis chips, are in
development.
Analysts have examined a range of strategies governments might
pursue to control the availability of DNA synthesizers including
registration, licensing and service. For example, governments could
attempt to limit the availability of raw materials such as essential
reagents or crucial spare parts such as capillary tube assemblies by
allowing manufacturers of such items to ship only to licensed owners of
DNA synthesizers. A machine with worn out capillary tubes or lacking
fresh reagents, on this reasoning, is useless. Without international
harmonization, however, the efforts of any one nation are unlikely to
result in much more than added inconvenience to those with malign
intentions.

Id.
Beckman DNA Synthesizer Oligo 1000M & Manual, EBAY, http://cgi.ebay.com/
Beckman-DNA-Synthesizer-Oligo-1000M-Manual/180678971753?pt=LH_DefaultDomain_0
&hash=item 2a114e5169 (last visited June 21, 2011).
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III. PRINCIPLES FOR ETHICS AND POLICY TOWARDS SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
There is an ongoing debate about methods for evaluating risks and
weighing costs and benefits. In much of the existing literature, the
debate is framed as a choice between two poles—a “precautionary” pole,
which is skeptical about the outcomes of new technologies, and a
“proactionary” pole, which is optimistic. In fact, a range of positions are
possible, and there is growing belief that the ideal position would be
somewhere between these two poles. Thus, the debate should be
understood not as a choice between two extreme alternatives, but as a
more nuanced decision about the appropriate degree of precaution to
take with respect to an emerging technology and the appropriate level
and kind of support to offer it.
A. Evaluating Potential Outcomes Using Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit
Analysis
The standard methods of evaluating outcomes in the United States
employ risk assessment procedures and economic tools, such as cost
benefit analysis. Often, the ostensible goal with these methods is to treat
the process of evaluating potential outcomes as an endeavor grounded in
technical expertise and the employment of quantitative models, making
it objective and analytic to the greatest extent possible. Risk assessment
provides tools for addressing three inquiries as objectively as possible:
whether a causal relationship exists between an entity or a project and
the particular effects on human health and the environment; what the
strength of the relationship is between that entity or project and the
effects; and what the extent of exposure is to the hazard.39 Cost-benefit
analysis is a way of deciding whether to proceed with a project by
estimating in monetary terms the public’s views of the project.40 By
looking to preference, understood as a matter of market choice and
averaged across a community, cost-benefit analysis also seeks to model
decision-making in a way that is value-neutral and objective.
Criticisms of these tools include concerns about the plausibility of an
objective, analytic method for identifying risks, gauging their severity,
and comparing costs against benefits. A number of commentators hold
that risk assessment fails to account adequately for the fact that the
identification of risk is unavoidably normative, depends partly on
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 3
(1983).
40
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 291 (2002)
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 129 (2005) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR].
39
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nonanalytic and emotional aspects of human nature, and is significantly
shaped by culture.41 Cost-benefit analysis has been criticized on grounds
that it distorts individuals’ values by representing them as a single unit
of measure42 and wrongly assumes that individuals’ preferences, as
reflected in market choices, accurately reflect their values.43 Cost-benefit
analysis has also been charged with failing to account adequately for
costs that will not surface for many years or that may affect only distant
people or nonhuman forms of life. These problems suggest that costbenefit analysis distorts or omits considerations important for public
policy. Critics also maintain that cost-benefit analysis functions poorly
when data about outcomes is scarce or unreliable.
Various commentators have discussed the concerns raised by
synthetic
biology’s
potential
risks,
costs,
and
benefits.
Recommendations for addressing these concerns range from improved
self-governance by scientists to restrictions on the publication of research
that might pose security threats, mechanisms for regulating the trade of
DNA sequences,44 centralized regulation, and outright prohibition of the
technology.45 If risk were addressed largely as a matter of selfgovernance, then questions arise about how self-governance should be
monitored or enforced. If risk were addressed through more centralized
oversight and control mechanisms, questions would arise about whether
those mechanisms were unacceptably holding back the science.
However risk is addressed, those mechanisms should extend to activities
in the private sector, and they should be flexible enough to deal with an
evolving technology, as the International Risk Governance Council has
stressed.

41
Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some Thoughts About Affect,
Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS, 2008, at 1; Dan M. Kahan et at., Cultural
Cognition of the Risks and Benefits of Nanotechnology, 4 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 87, 87−90
(2009) (explaining that “public attitudes are likely to be shaped by psychological dynamics
associated with cultural cognition”).
42
Douglas MacLean, The Ethics of Cost-Benefit Analysis: Incommensurable, Incompatible,
and Incomparable Values, in DEMOCRACY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 107 (Milton M.
Carrow, Robert P. Churchill & Joseph J. Cores eds., 1998).
43
Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution, and Opportunity Costs, 22 J.
LAND & USE 1, 17–18 (2006); Douglas MacLean, Ethics, Reasons, and Risk Analysis, in THE
ETHICS OF TECHNOLOGICAL RISK (Lotte Asveld & Savine Roeser eds., 2009).
44
GARFINKEL, supra note 33; Hans Bügl, et al., DNA Synthesis and Biological Security, 25
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 627, 627–29 (2007).
45
JIM THOMAS, EXTREME GENETIC ENGINEERING: AN INTRODUCTION TO SYNTHETIC
BIOLOGY (2007).
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B. Precautionary versus Proactionary Views of Risk Assessment
The use of risk assessment methods and economic analyses is
sometimes thought to constitute a generally proactive policy stance
toward a technology and is contrasted to the precautionary stance,
thought to be characteristic of European policy.
As noted, the
precautionary principle comes in a variety of flavors, with different
implications for policy. Also, while Europe has favored a precautionary
stance on some issues concerning biotechnologies, such as genetically
modified crops, it has been markedly proactionary on other topics, such
as construction of nuclear power plants, where the United States has
been more cautious.46
The precautionary principle is intended to address scenarios
involving uncertainty. Most commentators agree that the central idea
behind it is that plausible reasons to believe that a project may have
harmful effects provide justification for imposing measures to prevent
those effects, even in the absence of conclusive scientific evidence that
the effects will be realized.47 The precautionary principle shifts the
burden of proof from showing that harms will occur to showing that
harms will not occur.
Many acknowledge that the precautionary principle has
considerable intuitive appeal, as its central point is captured by such
maxims as “Look before you leap” or “Better safe than sorry.”
Nonetheless, it has come under fierce criticism. Where risk assessment
and cost-benefit analysis are seen as implausibly value-neutral and
analytic, the precautionary principle is seen as hopelessly vague and as
grounded only on emotions and, in particular, on crude fear.48 Where
cost-benefit analysis is seen as undercounting costs, the precautionary
principle is seen as dramatically overweighting them (indeed, critics see
it as blatantly anti-science).49 Cost-benefit analysis is thought to deal
46
Jonathan B. Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the United States and
Europe, 5 J. RISK RES. 317, 318–19 (2002) (comparing European and United States
approaches); see also generally, David Vogel, The Politics of Risk Regulation in Europe and the
U.S., 3 EUROPEAN ENVTL. L. 1, 1 (2003) (explaining that the United States has historically
been more cautious though the trend is changing).
47
Jensen, supra note 5, at 39 (defining the precautionary principle); David B. Resnik, The
Precautionary Principle and Medical Decision Making, 29 J. MED. & PHIL. 281, 285–90 (2004).
48
See generally Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multirisk World, in HUMAN AND
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509 (Dennis J. Paustenbach ed.,
2007) (explaining three versions of the precautionary principle); MAXMORE.COM, supra note
6 (explaining the shortcomings of the precautionary principle).
49
See Letter to Dr. Amy Gutmann, Chair, Presidential Commission for the Study of
Bioethical Issues 2 (Dec. 16, 2010), available at http://www.foe.org/sites/
default/files/Letter_to_Commission_Synthetic_Biology.pdf (“The precautionary principle
often is mischaracterized as anti-science, anti-technology, or anti-progress.”).
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poorly with uncertainty, while the precautionary principle is thought to
give so much weight to uncertainty that—because uncertainty abounds
in all possible courses of action—it will lead to paralyzed inaction.50
Some of these criticisms oversimplify the precautionary principle.
Different versions of the principle endorse varying degrees of
precaution, and some versions spread the burden of proof. For example,
the precautionary principle could require that not just any state of
uncertainty is sufficient to support imposition of constraints; rather there
must be a plausible causal story about possible harms.51 Meanwhile,
among proponents of a more proactionary stance, Cass Sunstein has
recently argued for a more moderate form of the cost-benefit paradigm.
He proposes, in place of the precautionary principle, a more limited and
focused “anti-catastrophe principle” for projects that may bring about
particularly dire risks or costs, but in which the probability of those risks
or costs occurring is highly uncertain.52
In a report on synthetic biology issued at the end of 2010, the PCSBI
recommended that policy toward emerging biotechnologies, including
synthetic biology, should be based on a “principle of responsible
stewardship” toward collective human well-being and the environment,
which in turn “calls for prudent vigilance.”53 The content of this
recommendation remains ambiguous, however. Although the notions of
“responsibility” and “prudent vigilance” suggest some degree of
precaution, the PCSBI did not attempt to fit its recommendations into the
existing literature on the precautionary principle. It also failed to explain
which evaluation processes are appropriate, even though it said that
evaluation of the technology should be “ongoing.” Furthermore, it did
not call for any particular constraints on synthetic biology; thus, critics
were left with the impression that the PCSBI had not called for any
substantive policy changes.54
Several considerations discussed in this section reveal that confusion
reigns over how to evaluate outcomes. Such considerations include: the
range and variety of positions about precaution; the growing sense of
compromise between seemingly opposed positions; the recognition that
countries once thought to favor one or the other stance turn out (on a
Cass R. Sunstein, The Precautionary Principle as a Basis for Decision Making, 2 THE
ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 1 (2005) (explaining that this would “eliminate all policies from
consideration—including the status quo—because almost all policies impose risks”).
51
Resnik, supra note 47, at 286.
52
SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR, supra note 40, at 109.
53
Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, supra note 7, at 4.
54
Kelly Trout, et al., NGOs Blast US Presidential Commission on Bioethics, THE ETC GROUP
(Dec. 16, 2010) http://www.etcgroup.org/en/node/5244 (outlining critiques of the PCSBI
recommendations).
50
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broader analysis) not to have a general principled preference for either;
and the questions about the value assumptions in risk assessment, costbenefit analysis, and the precautionary principle collectively point to the
need for a deeper understanding of these issues.
IV. INTERESTS AND IDENTITIES
Some public policy disputes, even those with a great deal at stake,
can be brought to apparent closure. Other disputes continue to fester
despite repeated efforts to reach a compromise. Consider two disputes
about biotechnology that took divergent paths in the U.S. and the UK:
human embryonic stem cell (“HESC”) research; and genetically modified
organisms (“GMOs”).
A. Comparing Biotechnology Disputes in the US and UK
On August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush ordered that federal
funding for HESC research would be allowed, but only on cell lines
created prior to the moment his policy was announced.55 A fierce battle
over public policy and public opinion followed swiftly. It was little
noted at the time that some sanctity-of-life advocates condemned the
President’s policy56 even as conservative defenders praised him as
Solomonic.57 The President was hemmed in by enthusiasm among
scientists and many Americans for what were depicted as the abundant
possibilities that HESC research could lead to treatments for dire
diseases on the one hand, and the adamant resistance on the other by
opponents of embryo research and abortion, who were among the
President’s and his party’s most committed supporters.
It took the election in 2008 of President Barack Obama for any
change in policy on HESC research. Within weeks of his inauguration,
President Obama rescinded the Bush policy and permitted, with limits,
federal funding for HESC lines created after August 9, 2001.58 On

55
President George W. Bush's Address on Stem Cell Research, CNN.COM (Aug. 9, 2001),
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/ALLPOLITICS/08/09/bush.transcript/index.html.
56
Cal Thomas, President Bush’s Compromise, TOWN HALL.COM (Aug. 14, 2001),
http://townhall.com/columnists/calthomas/2001/08/13/president_bushs_compromise.
57
George Will, Bush’s Stem Cell Decision was Brilliant, TOWN HALL.COM (Aug. 14, 2001),
http://townhall.com/columnists/georgewill/2001/08/14/bushs_stem_cell_decision_was
_brilliant.
58
See generally President Barack Obama, Signing of Stem Cell Executive Order and
Scientific Integrity Presidential Memorandum (March 9, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-of-the-President-As-Preparedfor-Delivery-Signing-of-Stem-Cell-Executive-Order-and-Scientific-Integrity-PresidentialMemorandum/ (announcing the change in US policy toward HESC).
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August 23, 2010 the District Court for the District of Columbia issued a
temporary injunction blocking President Obama’s executive order.59
Roughly one month later on September 28, an appeals court ruled that
funding could proceed while arguments were being heard.60 Then, on
April 29, 2011, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit by a 2-1 vote vacated the district court’s
injunction.61 The judges, all Republican appointees, ruled that the
challengers were unlikely to prevail on the merits of the lawsuit. No one
who understands the determination of sanctity-of-life advocates in the
U.S. could think that this court ruling, or any future one, could end the
conflict over HESC research. Something beyond merely the interests of
the parties seems to be at stake in the dispute over HESCs.
In sharp contrast, the UK has allowed research on embryos
remaining after assisted reproductive procedures since 1990. UK law
also allows for the creation of embryos to be used in research. Most such
research falls under the authority of the Human Fertilisation and
The 1990 law was initially
Embryology Authority (“HFEA”).62
interpreted as allowing research on embryos only in the field of
reproductive biology; a new interpretation in 2001 gave permission for
many kinds of basic research in addition to reproduction.63 The HFEA
was also willing to allow human embryos to be used in certain lines of
research involving cloning, but this authorization has been challenged.
Conflicts over embryo research have occurred, but they have failed to
engender the fierce and implacable character of such debates in the US.
Could this be merely a reflection of national character, perhaps an
aversion to political conflict? The evidence suggests otherwise.
Consider the response of the UK and its fellow nations in the
European Union to GMOs, particularly as they affect the foods available
to people. In the UK and other European Union member nations, GMO
food products inspired energetic public resistance; the regulatory scheme
devised is meant to ensure that GMO foods must endure a rigorous
approval process. Producers are required to demonstrate that the
genetically modified trait is as safe as comparable conventional products,
rather than the burden of proof resting on those concerned over the
Sherley v. Sebelius, 704 F. Supp. 2d 63, 73 (D.D.C. 2010).
Order Granting Motion for Stay Pending Appeal, Case No. 10-5287 (Sept. 28, 2010).
61
Sherley v. Sebelius, 2011 WL 1599685 (D.C. Cir. 2011); George J. Annas, Sudden Death
for a Challenge to Federal Funding of Stem-Cell Research, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. e47 (2011); I.
Glenn Cohen & Eli Y. Adashi, Human Embryonic Stem-Cell Research Under Siege: Battle Won
but Not the War, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. e47(1) (2011) (describing the District of Columbia
Circuit opinion interpreting the Dickey-Wicker Amendment).
62
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, 37 HMSO (Eng.).
63
Id.
59
60
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suspected dangers of the new GMO product. Producers also have to test
for changes in plant metabolism that may have been caused by the
genetic manipulation.
In sharp contrast, the US regulatory scheme for GMO foods gives
authority to the Food and Drug Administration under the Federal Food,
Drug & Cosmetic Act,64 just as it does for other food products. No
unique consideration is mandated for genetically modified foods.
Complaints by the public have been isolated and sporadic.
B. The Effect Conflicting Interests Have on Public Policy
There may be an alternative way of looking at policy disputes. Some
flare fiercely for a time then subside as the policy is more or less
begrudgingly accepted by both sides. Others, like HESC research in the
US and GMOs in the UK, prove to be far more enduringly contentious,
with the losers merely biding their time until circumstances allow the
battle to be renewed.
The contrast between the two types of disputes is portrayed nicely
by the differences between two recent major policy fights. As the U.S.
plunged into deep recession in 2008, the very existence of its big three
automobile manufacturers was in doubt. If they collapsed, so would
many smaller companies that provided parts to them.
Many
manufacturing jobs were at risk. The Chrysler Corporation came closest
to folding. Its survival depended upon restructuring: the only certainty
was that there would be plenty of losers. Retired workers faced reduced
pensions and health benefits; current workers feared closed factories,
eliminated jobs, and reduced salaries and benefits; and new employees
confronted sharply lower wages and benefits. Creditors risked their
invoices going unpaid. Investors who bought Chrysler’s bonds and
stocks over the years faced the prospects of their holdings plummeting in
value or even becoming worthless.
The battles over whose interests would be protected and to what
extent were fierce and prolonged. In the end, though, the restructuring
was accomplished. Each party extracted what they could, and life went
on for everyone concerned, not least the Chrysler Corporation (and its
new partner and possible eventual majority owner, Fiat).
The restructuring of Chrysler was an example of a public policy
conflict over interests.
Disputes over interests have noteworthy
characteristics. First, tradeoffs are permitted and regarded as legitimate;
they are essential components of bargaining and negotiation. Second,
genuine compromises are both possible and anticipated. A key element
64

Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399d (2010).
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in compromises in disputes over interests is that in practice as well as in
principle all parties can accept such compromises with no one feeling
violated. If one party felt it was treated badly, either it failed to
understand the nature of such disputes or the resolution failed to balance
the parties’ interests equitably. It is not uncommon for parties to step
away from hard-fought battles over interests with grudging respect for
their counterparts who were, after all, playing with great skill by the
same rules and for comparable stakes. Third, public interests can also be
represented in policy disputes over private and commercial interests.
The federal government’s sense of urgency in the Chrysler restructuring
had many contributing causes, but among them was surely the concern
over the waves of industry destruction and the hemorrhaging of job
losses that would come in the wake of Chrysler’s impending demise.
Such losses would further endanger the prospects for economic recovery
as well as increase government expenditures for unemployment
compensation and other social safety net programs.
C. Public Policy Issues in the Context of Identity
The dynamics of certain other public policy disputes, however, look
quite different. Kristin Luker, in her landmark 1984 book, Abortion and
the Politics of Motherhood, shows the nature of this difference.65 Luker
describes the explosive growth of the pro-life movement after the
Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade.66 This movement, which
had been largely populated by men, suddenly found a wave of women
rushing forward, many of whom had never before been politically active.
Luker writes: “this round of the abortion debate is so passionate and
hard-fought because it is a referendum on the place and meaning of
motherhood.”67
After Roe v. Wade, the battle over abortion in the U.S. was no longer
being fought over fine points of theology or moral philosophy (though it
was never entirely that simple). Now, it was clearly also a dispute over
identities, over what gave the lives of many Americans meaning and
significance. Disputes over identities are arguments over core beliefs
about one’s place in the world and the possibilities for flourishing. Such
beliefs are not subject to tradeoff; compromise, if it is possible at all, is
never more than tactical and temporary. For any stable, lasting policy to
emerge identities must either prevail or evolve.

KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1985).
Id. at 193 (describing the effect of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) on the pro-life
movement).
67
Id.
65
66
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Evolution of identities seemed a possibility in the abortion debate
with the rise in two-worker families and increasing concern for wage
equality between men and women. On the pro-choice side of the debate,
women should have the option of a life as both a mother and a worker;
uncontrolled fertility was the principle threat to success in the
workplace, therefore options for preventing the birth of unplanned
children, from birth control to abortion, were seen as instrumental to the
possibility of women’s flourishing. In recent decades, spurred by
economic aspirations and often by necessity, many women—who were
primarily identified as mothers—entered the workforce. The possibility
existed that women in these circumstances might come to share the
concerns of pro-choice advocates about uncontrolled fertility as a barrier
to financial success. To the extent such women came to value their
identities as workers as well as mothers, their attitudes towards abortion
may evolve as well. I offered this speculation in The Worth of a Child in
199668 but I am not aware of any evidence such changes have taken
place.
Luker’s interviews with advocates in the pro-life and pro-choice
communities revealed intriguing differences far more extensive than
their attitudes towards abortion. Advocates differed on a number of
values, on their beliefs about the essential natures of women and men,
and on what constitutes flourishing for women and men. An image that
may be useful is that of the paths women and men must travel if they are
to flourish. The details of the journey are not central here: what matters
is whether the paths are seen as essentially separate or as overlapping.
In this metaphor, pro-life advocates tended to view women and men
as walking separate paths—complementary and parallel perhaps, but
mostly distinct. If women are by their nature nurturing, parental, and
ill-equipped for the cold competitive world of employment, men were
less well suited to be parents but eager for the gladiatorial battles of
factory, sales floor and office. For pro-life advocates, women’s and
men’s natures directed them down different paths toward flourishing.
Pro-choice advocates on the other hand were inclined to draw far
less sharp boundaries, if they acknowledged such differences at all.
Women could find great satisfaction in being nurturing parents, but so
could men. Men might or might not relish competition at work, but
women could also enjoy the challenges of a career and the satisfaction of
bringing home a paycheck. In the worldview of pro-choice advocates,
the paths to flourishing for women and for men may be
indistinguishable or, at the least, considerably overlapped.

68

See generally THOMAS H. MURRAY, THE WORTH OF A CHILD (1996).
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Given the far-reaching differences in identities between pro-life and
pro-choice advocates, it should be no surprise that arguments between
the two camps often break down into mutual unintelligibility with each
side wondering of the other: How could anyone think such a thing?
Of course, to claim a simple dichotomy between interest-based and
identity-based disputes underestimates the complexities of both the
concepts and of the disputes to which they may be applied. Luker found
that pro-life and pro-choice advocates differed significantly in their
education, work experience and job qualifications.69 Interests, that is,
seemed to track identities. It is likely that people fashion their identities,
at least in part, according to their interests; it is also likely that their
interests take a shape that is consistent with their identities. Identities
and interests, that is, develop together and affect one another.
How can we know when we confront a dispute over identities rather
than mere interests? One clue is the question at issue. Identity disputes
tend to be over questions like: Who am I? Does this threaten how I
understand the meaning or significance of my life, my place in the
world? Would the likely changes or losses to follow rock the foundation
of my being? People can experience events that are simultaneous blows
to identities and interests. Millions of Americans who lost their jobs in
the Great Recession and have not found new ones are suffering a double
loss: to their economic interests, income and life opportunities, and also
to their identity as a reliable provider for their family.
Understanding the heightened stakes when identities are threatened
may illuminate why disputes over estates and inheritances are often so
volatile and painful. Because they are often not only over interests such
as property and money, they can also be fresh fields for battle over one’s
identity and status within the family, over the relationships—good and
awful—that formed one’s personality and identity. Tommy Smothers
regularly complained to his brother Dick: “Momma always liked you
best!” For them it was comedy; for many parties to inheritance disputes,
sentiments like these are excruciatingly deep and painful. So it is with
disputes that engage identities.
V. INTERESTS, IDENTITIES, AND SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
Because synthetic biology is not one thing but rather multiple
streams, each proceeding at its own pace and towards its own goals, we
should not expect any singular answer to the question whether conflicts
over synthetic biology will encompass identities as well as interests. It
will depend on the actors, the goals, and the stakes. In many cases, the
69
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ethical concerns raised by synthetic biology are likely to be intelligible in
terms of consequences and interests. Policy makers, the public, and
health professionals worried over the possibilities of bioterror,
biowarfare and bioerror will press their case against other actors who
believe the fears are exaggerated and worry that scientific progress—and
ultimately product development and profits—will be slowed.
Similarly, concerns over social and economic dislocations caused by
developments in synthetic biology appear to be mostly over interests,
though often not the interests of the parties carrying forward the
argument. For example, advocacy groups such as ETC claim that using
synthetic biology to help produce the anti-malaria drug artimisinin
would deprive harvesters of sweet wormwood bark—the current source
of artimisinin—of their livelihood.70 In a comparable vein, advocates for
the poor and people in the developing world sound warnings over the
possibility that large scale biosynthesis for biofuels or industrial
chemicals could lead to the displacement of food crops in favor of
producing raw agricultural materials for synthetic biology
manufacturing, thereby making food more expensive and scarce.
In principle, conflicts such as these could be negotiated,
compromises reached that would give all parties at least a portion of
what they want, and though not everyone may be happy, no one need
feel violated. Are there concerns about synthetic biology that could
result in conflicts over identities? This section will focus here on one
such concern: humankind’s relationship with the natural world.
Boldt and Müller sketch one approach.71 They argue that synthetic
biology marks a fundamental shift in our relationship with nature that
translates readily into consequences: people will become overconfident
in their abilities to control life and overreach with potentially dire
consequences; the more we come to regard life as mere artifact, the
greater the risk that we will regard—and treat—higher organisms with
diminished respect and protection.72 Though their basic stance appeals
to identity—humankind’s place in the cosmos—their worries concentrate
on the bad things that will happen as we humans, in bliss and ignorance,
shed the modest cloak of manipulators of what exists in favor of the
power suit worn proudly by those who want to recast life according to
their whims.73 While such a gradual transformation of human identities

ETC GROUP, THE NEW BIOMASTERS: SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND THE NEXT ASSAULT ON
BIODIVERSITY AND LIVELIHOODS 40 (2010).
71
Joachim Boldt & Oliver Müller, Newtons of the Leaves of Grass, 26 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 387 (2008).
72
Id. at 388.
73
Id.
70
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may have consequences, it does not seem all that different from other
ways humankind has devised to assert control over nature from
agriculture and plant breeding to the refining and shaping of metals.
These may have altered human identities for better or worse, but they
did not commonly erupt into conflicts over clashing identities among
different groups of people. The consequences of such evolutionary
changes in identity are well worth attending to; but they do not amount
to conflicts over identities on the order of embryo politics in the U.S.
The clearest encroachment on “creation” would be to create life out
of inanimate matter, at the hand of and according to the precise design of
humans—a goal that was approximated in the recent claim to have
created a synthetic cell.74 The initial claims were colorful and bold.
Craig Venter at a press conference described the cell line as “the first selfreplicating species we’ve had on the planet whose parent is a
computer.”75 Another leader of the team of scientists who accomplished
this feat, Clyde Hutchison, acknowledged that “‘synthetic’” means a
“‘chemically synthesized’” genome, not an entirely novel life form.76
“‘You’d like to design a genome from scratch,’ he says. ‘You’d like to
put it into a cytoplasm that you built up from scratch. But we’re trying
to do something we can do.’”77 David Baltimore, a distinguished
scientist, described the accomplishment as “a technical tour de force”
rather than breakthrough science.78 Referring to Venter, he remarked
“He has not created life, only mimicked it.”79
Is this technological accomplishment an example of what Boldt and
Müller call “manipulatio,” “creatio ex existendo,” or is it the further leap
into “creatio ex nihilo”—creation out of nothing?80 A cautious appraisal
seems in order. In producing the cell line it dubbed Mycoplasma
mycoides JCVI-syn1.0, the JCVI team used the sequence of a naturally
occurring microbe. Into that functional genome they inserted a number
of non-coding, non-functional sequences—call them genetic tattoos—
including three brief quotations, the names of the article’s authors, and
an email address.81 In an interview, Venter noted that fourteen genes
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suspected of being pathogenic (the naturally occurring bacteria that
infects goats) were cut out.82 The original genome was thus somewhat
modified in both nonfunctional and possibly functional ways, but the
overall architecture of the genome was a more or less faithful replica of a
naturally occurring organism.
Furthermore, stitching the DNA
sequences together took place in yeast cells, and the cytoplasm and cell
membrane—everything but the genome—began as a healthy, normal
Mycoplasma capricolum into which the chemically synthesized and
yeast-assembled genome was placed. An impressive accomplishment,
no doubt; but far short of “creatio ex nihilo,” and possibly even short of
“creatio ex existendo”—a “mere” “manipulatio,” perhaps.83
There is another way to think about synthetic biology’s impact on
our relationship with nature.
Paul Lauritzen’s chapter in Greg
Kaebnick’s new book, The Ideal of Nature, draws inspiration from the
work of two notable authors, Cormac McCarthy and Wendell Berry.
Lauritzen writes of McCarthy’s novel The Crossing84:
This is the central worry of The Crossing: human
overreaching has the potential irrevocably to change the
world in ways that humans cannot, or at least do not,
begin to comprehend. And some things, when they are
changed, cannot be made right again. In exercising our
power, whether in relation to the environment or in
relation to agriculture or biomedical technology, the
appropriate attitudes are awe and respect for the
mystery of the world around us. The appropriate virtue
is humility. Instead we act like “a god insatiable whom
no ceding could appease.”85
Bonnie Steinbock’s chapter in the same book warns against any simple
acceptance of nature or human nature as a clear guide for moral action.
But she also cautions against hubris: “Humility in the face of unknown
risks and limited human knowledge is clearly warranted, especially in
light of human destruction of fragile ecosystems. Moreover, another
aspect of humility is to be awed by the power and beauty of nature. To
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reduce nature to its commercial value is crass.”86 The notable British
philosopher Kate Soper’s contribution provides a similar caution:
There are, after all, aspects of human existence and
response we may do better to acknowledge rather than
seek to rationalize. Even if we cannot point to any
essential or universal aspects of ourselves that underlie
our forms of resistance to specific forms of
biotechnology, such intuitions are always to be attended
to as signaling, not so much the limits of what we can do
to ourselves and other creatures and the rest of nature,
but what we can do and still expect to live well, to be
happy, and to experience the rewards of membership of
an ethical community.87
These authors are not indifferent to consequences or interests, but
their principle focus is on cultivating moral virtues such as humility,
morally fraught attitudes such as awe, and on preserving the possibilities
for human flourishing in moral communities—that is, on matters not
readily reducible to consequences or interests. Do these concerns about
our relationship with nature and human nature amount to differences in
identities?
Consider the worldview of the noted author Wendell Berry as
described by Lauritzen: “The traditional respect, reverence, and awe
with which humans approached nature have been lost. In their place,
we find a consumerist mindset that sees nature merely as raw material to
be used without limit or constraint.”88 It would be difficult to reconcile
this view with the consistent thread that runs through all the major
variants of synthetic biology: an engineering mindset that aims to
replace complexity with control and predictability.
Engineering
metaphors of mechanisms, devices and circuits run squarely up against
Berry’s warning: “By means of the machine metaphor, we have
eliminated any fear or awe or reverence or humility or delight or joy that
might have restrained us in our use of the world.”89
Of course, it is possible that Berry’s worldview is idiosyncratic, not a
widely shared mark of identity. But there are hints of a wider uneasiness
Bonnie Steinbock, The Appeal to Nature, in THE IDEAL OF NATURE: DEBATES ABOUT
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 98, 110 (2011).
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(2011) (citations omitted).
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with the ambitions of synthetic biology.
A 2010 survey asked
respondents to choose their top concern about synthetic biology from
among five options.90 A quarter of the respondents chose as their
primary concern that it is morally wrong to create artificial life, and more
than a quarter were most worried that synthetic biology could be used to
create harmful things such as biological weapons.91 Twenty-three
percent chose “negative health effects for humans” as their primary fear,
thirteen percent picked damage to the environment.92 Only eight
percent claimed none of these were a worry.93 All surveys have their
limitations and no simple translation is possible between this survey’s
results and Berry’s call for fear, awe, reverence and humility—to say
nothing of delight or joy. But neither should we dismiss the concerns
expressed here as merely confused or ignorant.
Recall the markers of conflicts over identities: tradeoffs are not
readily available; integrity-preserving compromises are elusive; and
mutual unintelligibility prevails. It is concerning that this last feature,
mutual unintelligibility, may have already appeared. Synthetic biology
enthusiasts often take it as a matter of faith that if the public understood
their aims and methods, their enthusiasm would be universally
embraced. But this may be prematurely optimistic. The same survey
found a majority of Americans supporting the further cautious
development of synthetic biology, but also a majority wanting federal
regulation rather than leaving it up to voluntary guidelines.
One finding, though, is particularly striking. When respondents
were asked their initial impressions of synthetic biology, nineteen
percent said that the “benefits [would] outweigh the risks;” only sixteen
percent worried “that the risks will outweigh the benefits.”94 A third of
those polled judged risks and benefits to be about equal with the
remainder saying they were not sure.95 Respondents were then given
what was designed as a neutral description of synthetic biology. After
that brief explanation, the percentage of those worried that risks will
outweigh benefits more than doubled to thirty-three.96 Those who were
initially not sure broke roughly two-and-a-half to one in favor of risks
outweighing benefits.97 Proponents of synthetic biology who are
See generally HART RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, AWARENESS & IMPRESSIONS OF SYNTHETIC
BIOLOGY (2010) (reporting the results of these findings).
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confidant that the more the public knows, the more favorable their
attitudes will become should attend to the implications of this study.
The simplistic assumption that the problem is the public’s ignorance is
unhelpful here.
VI. CONCLUSION
It cannot be said whether synthetic biology will provoke deep,
persistent disputes like those over embryo research in the U.S. or GMOs
in Europe. It’s wise, though, to be patient with serious efforts to
articulate concerns that cannot be readily cashed out in terms of
consequences. Identities locate people in their cultures and moral
worlds; they provide narratives of meaning, and map pathways to
flourishing. We should acknowledge that not all efforts to reengineer
biology are hubristic overreaches, but also recognize that humility and
awe are important moral attitudes in shaping our identities, particularly
our relationship to nature and to powerful means for altering that
relationship, such as those given by synthetic biology. The paths to
flourishing available to us, and the prospects for fruitful voyages along
those paths, may call for uncommon vision and wisdom that see beyond
stale and comforting metaphors.
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